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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL H. STEFFENSEN, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner/Cross-
Respondent, 
vs. 
SMITHS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-
Petitioner. 
RESPONSE/REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER/CROSS-RESPONDENT 
RESPONSE TO SMITH'S OPENING BRIEF 
Inasmuch as both sides1 petitions for certiorari were 
granted, this brief includes Mrs. Steffensen's response to the 
issue raised by Smith's and a reply to Smith's response to her 
opening brief. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(a) (1992) which grants the Utah Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the Court 
of Appeals." Mrs. Steffensen's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
was granted on May 12, 1992. 
Case No. 910560 
Priority No. 14 
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ISSUES PRESENTED BY SMITH'S FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Smith's presents one issue for 
review: 
I. Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that 
Smith's owed a duty to Mrs, Steffensen? Smith's Cross-Petition 
for Certiorari at 2-4. 
The issues presented by Mrs. Steffensen for consideration 
are detailed in the Brief of Petitioner at 1-2. 
In reviewing decisions of the Court of Appeals, this Court 
accords the lower court's statement of law, statutory 
interpretation, or legal conclusion no particular deference. The 
decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey, 823 
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules pertinent 
to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text of 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, Pearl H. Steffensen, an eighty-two 
year old woman, was seriously injured while shopping at a Smith's 
store located at 2100 South and 900 East in Salt Lake City, Utah 
when a shoplifter, being pursued through the store by Smith's 
employees, collided with her, knocking her to the floor. (R. 
2 
1242 at 5-6).x 
Mrs. Steffensen commenced this action against Smith's 
alleging that Smith's negligence was the cause of her injuries. 
Among other things, Mrs. Steffensen alleged that Smith's failed 
to properly train its employees to deal with shoplifters; that 
Smith's employees violated Smith's written policies before 
apprehending Mr. Burnett by failing to deter him; and that 
Smith's employees violated Smith's written policies by chasing 
and attempting to stop Mr. Burnett after he ran from them. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 485 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). After presentation of all the evidence, Smith's 
counsel moved for a partial directed verdict on the grounds that 
Smith's failure to adequately train its employees and to deter 
Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not be the proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1216 at 2-6). The trial judge 
granted Smith's motion. (R. 1216 at 7). The jury found that 
Smith's had acted negligently but that the negligence was not the 
proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1198) 
Mrs. Steffensen appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming: 
(1) that the trial court improperly granted the partial directed 
verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 
1
 All references are to the record page number. All 
transcripts and depositions are stamped with a record page number 
on the opening page. Because of confusion in the denomination of 
the transcripts (i.e. there are at least three transcripts labeled 
"Vol. IV"), transcript citations are given as "R. at " where 
the first number is the record page number of the transcript and 
the second number is the page number within the transcript volume 
e.g., R. 1243 at 50 denotes page 50 of the transcript volume 
labeled as record page 1243. 
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32 which required the jury to find that Smith's employees must be 
able to specifically predict Mr. Burnett's actions in order to 
find that Smith's actions caused Mrs. Steffensen's injuries, and 
(3) that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony 
regarding Smith's training practices and the apportionment of 
fault between Smith's and Mr. Burnett. The Court of Appeals 
issued an opinion affirming the trial court on October 29, 1991. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
committed error in granting the partial directed verdict. 820 
P.2d at 489. However, the Court of Appeals then applied a 
harmless error analysis and held that the trial court's error was 
harmless. 820 P.2d at 490. The Court of Appeals also held that 
Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but that the error was harmless. 
820 P.2d at 490. Finally, the Court of Appeals held the 
exclusion of expert testimony on employee training was harmless 
error and that the exclusion of testimony on the apportionment of 
fault was proper. 820 P.2d at 491. This Court granted Mrs. 
Steffensen's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on May 12, 1992. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Petitioner at pages 
5 through 8. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In response to the issues raised by Smith's in its Brief of 
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Cross-Petitioner, Mrs. Steffensen first argues that Smith's claim 
that Mrs. Steffensen did not establish a prima facie case is not 
properly before the Court. The issue was not raised in Smith's 
Petition for Certiorari and therefore, should not be considered 
by the Court. 
Even if the Court considers Smith's claim, the evidence 
presented by Mrs. Steffensen did establish a prima facie case. 
The Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence was presented 
and that the trial court's directed verdict was erroneous. 
Smith's presents nothing which contradicts those holdings. 
Finally, Smith's claim that it owed no duty to Mrs. 
Steffensen to protect her from the acts of others is meritless. 
The Court of Appeals held that Smith's owed Mrs. Steffensen a 
duty and the facts and case law substantiate that holding. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT IMPROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
SMITHS. 
In its cross-appeal, Smith's claims that the Court of 
Appeals improperly held that the trial court erroneously directed 
a verdict. In advancing this claim, Smith's argues that (1) the 
evidence did not establish a prima facie case and (2) Smith's 
owed no duty to Mrs. Steffensen. However, one of Smith's 
arguments is not properly before the Court. Furthermore, Smith's 
ignores the facts of the case, the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, and substantial case law in making its arguments. 
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A. SMITH'S ARGUMENT THAT MRS. STEFFENSEN DID NOT ESTABLISH 
A PRIMA FACIE CASE WAS NOT RAISED IN SMITH'S PETITION 
FOR CERTIORARI AND THEREFORE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT 
Cross-Petitioner Smith's claims, "The trial court properly 
directed a verdict to exclude evidence of actions prior to the 
point at which Smithfs had a duty to protect Mrs. Steffensen from 
the acts of the shoplifter. The court of appeals1 determination 
that the directed verdict was improper was erroneous." Brief of 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 4. Smith's then asserts that Mrs. 
Steffensen's evidence did not establish a prima facie case 
sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. Brief 
of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 6, 8-9. However, this portion 
of Smith's claim is not properly before the Court. 
Rule 49 (a) (4) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
which governs petitions for certiorari, provides that: "[o]nly 
the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included 
therein will be considered by the Supreme Court." Smith's Cross-
Petition for Certiorari sets forth only one issue for this Court 
to review, to wit: Did Smith's owe a duty to protect Mrs. 
Steffensen from the acts of a shoplifter prior to having 
knowledge that a crime was being committed. Smith's Cross-
Petition for Certiorari at 2-4. While the issue presented under 
the section "Questions Presented for Review" in Smith's Cross-
Petition for Certiorari is somewhat oblique and arguably includes 
sufficiency of the prima facie case presented by Mrs. Steffensen, 
the argument section of Smith's Cross-Petition concerns itself 
exclusively with the question of whether Utah law imposes a duty 
6 
on Smith's to protect Mrs. Steffensen.2 Indeed, no mention is 
made in the argument section of the cross-petition concerning the 
sufficiency of the prima facie case. Therefore, Mrs. Steffensen 
contends that issue raised by Smith's concerning the sufficiency 
of the prima facie case is not "fairly included" within Smith's 
Cross-Petition for Certiorari so as to warrant consideration by 
this Court. 
B. SMITHS CONTENTION THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY MRS. 
STEFFENSEN DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE IS 
MERITLESS. 
Even if this Court addresses the improperly raised issue of 
sufficiency of the prima facie case, the Court should find 
Smith's argument to be without merit. 
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted 
its motion for a partial directed verdict. The effect of the 
trial court's ruling was to exclude much of the evidence already 
presented at trial on the issue of proximate cause from the 
jury's consideration. Specifically, the jury was not allowed to 
consider any act or omission on the part of Smith's prior to the 
time Mr. Burnett was placed under arrest. 
2
 The question posed by Smith's in "Questions Presented for 
Review" is: 
Did the court of appeals erroneously 
determine that the trial court had erred in 
partially directing verdict as to activities 
of Smith's prior to the time it knew Mr. 
Burnett was committing a crime and apprehended 
him? 
Cross Petition for Certiorari at 1. Despite the phrasing of the 
question, the argument presented by Smith's focuses exclusively on 
the duty question. 
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In making its ruling, the trial court failed to recognize 
that the evidence was such that reasonable jurors could have 
arrived at a verdict in favor of Mrs. Steffensen. Additionally, 
the trial court failed to consider the evidence in its proper 
light. Finally, the trial court improperly weighed the evidence 
when it made its ruling on Smith's motion for a directed verdict. 
The trial court made a factual finding that Smith's conduct prior 
to Mr. Burnett's apprehension was not the proximate cause of Mrs. 
Steffensen's injuries. However, proximate cause is generally an 
issue of fact to be determined by the jury. Therefore, as the 
Court of Appeals found, the trial court's direction of a verdict 
in favor of Smith's was erroneous. 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when a trial court is 
able to conclude that reasonable minds would not differ on the 
facts from the evidence presented.3 Management Comm. v. 
3
 In its brief, Smith's argues that the party against whom 
a motion for a directed verdict is made is required to show on 
appeal that it established a prima facie case in the trial court. 
Brief of Respondent at 6. In fact, the law in Utah as to the 
amount of evidence required to withstand a motion for a directed 
verdict in unclear. Smith's cites Highland Construction Co. v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984), in support 
of its contention that an appellant must first demonstrate that he 
established a prima facie case in the trial court. In fact, 
Highland Construction cites Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1983), to support the proposition "We will view the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was 
directed, in order to determine whether Highland had established a 
prima facie case." 683 P.2d at 1045. However, in Cruz, this Court 
stated that "unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
plaintiff's claim, a court should not direct the verdict for the 
defendant." 660 P.2d at 729. (emphasis added) This quotation from 
Cruz seems to indicate that evidence less than that necessary to 
establish a prima facie case will be sufficient to withstand the 
challenge of a motion for a directed verdict and approaches the 
8 
Grevstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). In 
making this determination, the court is required to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against the 
directed verdict is sought. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 
1980). An appellate court must apply the same standard as the 
trial court when reviewing a directed verdict. Management Comm., 
652 P.2d at 898. Furthermore, this Court has stated that a trial 
court is prohibited from considering the weight of the evidence 
in passing on a motion for a directed verdict. Cerritos Trucking 
Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982). If an 
appellate court finds that there was a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom that would allow 
reasonable minds to differ on the facts determined from the 
evidence and that would support a verdict in favor of the losing 
party, "the directed verdict cannot be sustained." Management 
Comm., 652 P.2d at 898. 
In this case, Smith's argues that Mrs. Steffensen's evidence 
"scintilla of the evidence" rule which some jurisdictions apply in 
determining a motion for directed verdict. However, Highland 
Construction also cites Lindsay v. Gibbons & Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 
497 P.2d 28 (1972). In Lindsay, this Court stated that the 
plaintiff must present sufficient evidence "to establish a prima 
facie case against the defendant in order to have his cause 
submitted for consideration by the jury.11 497 P.2d at 30. However, 
Lindsay cites no authority for this proposition. Because of this 
dichotomy in the cases, the amount of evidence required to be 
presented by a plaintiff in order to withstand a motion for a 
directed verdict is unclear and depends entirely upon which case a 
party chooses to cite. However, in this case, the issue is moot 
because the Court of Appeals applied a prima facie evidence test in 
evaluating whether or not Mrs. Steffensen had presented sufficient 
evidence to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. Steffensen, 
820 P.2d at 486. 
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did not establish a prima facie case. Brief of Respondent at 6-
9. However, in making this claim, Smith's ignores the standard 
applied by the Court of Appeals and the facts recited by the 
Court of Appeals which it found did establish that Mrs. 
Steffensen had presented a prima facie case. 
The Court of Appeals applied a prima facie case standard in 
its of review of this case. Steffensen. 820 P.2d at 486. The 
Court of Appeals then delineated the evidence presented by Mrs. 
Steffensen which showed that Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett 
could have been viewed by a reasonable juror as the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The Court of Appeals 
stated: 
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a 
matter of law, that Mr. Burnett's acts 
following apprehension broke the chain of 
causation between Smith's failure to deter 
Mr. Burnett and Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
Substantial evidence before the jury 
indicated that Smith's could have reasonably 
foreseen that the customer would be injured 
by a shoplifter's decision to run, 
particularly when, instead of deterring the 
shoplifter, Smith's chose to "play cat and 
mouse." Certainly Mrs. Steffensen presented 
evidence on this theory of causation. A 
closer question is whether any reasonable 
juror could conclude that the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn from it shows 
Smith's failure to deter it was a 
contributing cause of Mrs. Steffensen's 
injury. 
In this case, Mrs. Steffensen introduced 
substantial expert testimony that, in dealing 
with shoplifters, deterrence measures prevent 
shoplifting and thus promote customer safety. 
During trial, Mrs. Steffensen presented 
testimony from security and shoplifting 
experts who testified that Smith's employees 
failed to use reasonable means to handle Mr. 
10 
Burnett, a suspected shoplifter, sufficient 
to protect the safety of the store's 
customers. These experts identified two 
specific and generally accepted techniques 
that retail stores employ when dealing with 
shoplifters and which Smith's failed to 
implement. First, the experts testified that 
a retail store could take steps to "deter" a 
suspected shoplifter from carrying out his or 
her plan by taking such affirmative action as 
making direct eye contact with the suspected 
shoplifter, approaching the suspected 
shoplifter and offering assistance, and 
calling for security over the public intercom 
system. Second, the experts testified that a 
retail store should also train its employees 
to use care when apprehending a shoplifter. 
The experts agreed that employees should not 
chase or use force with a shoplifter who 
becomes violent or flees. These experts 
testified that stores employ, or should 
employ, such techniques primarily to protect 
the safety of their customers and to prevent 
incidents precisely like the one which 
occurred in this case. In addition, Mrs. 
Steffensen submitted copies of Smith's 
employee training manuals which advocated 
deterrence in dealing with shoplifters. Mr. 
Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he 
thought Smith's employees were watching while 
he was in the store. He went to get in the 
check-out line and waited there until he 
believed he was not being watched. Further, 
Mrs. Steffensen's experts testified that 
approximately 5% of all shoplifters, when 
apprehended, run. They likewise testified 
that the proper use of deterrence techniques 
can reduce this number by reducing the number 
of shoplifters as a whole. 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488-489. The court also cited evidence 
from Smith's experts which indicated that deterrence and 
refraining from using force or chasing a shoplifter are valid 
security methods. 820 P.2d at 489, n. 3. Finally, the Court of 
Appeals cited sections from Smith's employee manuals which 
contained statements advocating the use of deterrence techniques 
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in handling shoplifters and instructed employees on the 
importance of customer safety in handling shoplifters. 820 P.2d 
at 489, n. 4. 
This evidence led the Court of Appeals to conclude that, as 
a matter of law, the trial court's ruling that Smith's failure to 
deter Mr. Burnett could have been a contributing proximate cause 
of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. The court concluded: "[t]here was 
probably sufficient evidence produced from which a reasonable 
juror could infer that Smith's failure to deter was a negligent 
act, as it would have been reasonably foreseeable to an 
adequately trained employee that his or her decision to apprehend 
the shoplifter in a crowded store could have led to a customer's 
injury." 820 P.2d at 489. 
Smith's ignores all of this evidence when it makes its claim 
that Mrs. Steffensen did not present a prima facie case. 
Furthermore, Smith's totally disregards the standard of review in 
both the trial and appellate courts which requires that any 
inferences from the evidence should be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the party being moved against. Clearly, the issue 
should have been presented to the jury as the Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded. The Court of Appeals stated: 
In sum, the issue of proximate cause 
should be taken from the jury only where: 
(1) there is no evidence to establish a 
causal connection, thus leaving causation to 
jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable 
persons could not differ on the inferences to 
be derived from the evidence on proximate 
causation. 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 487 (citation omitted). Here, the 
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evidence was sufficient to establish a causal connection and, as 
the Court of Appeals found, reasonable persons could have 
differed on the inferences to be derived from the evidence and 
proximate cause. Therefore, despite Smith's argument to the 
contrary, the issue should have gone to the jury and the trial 
court erred in removing it from jury consideration. 
C. CONTRARY TO ITS CLAIM, SMITH'S OWED A DUTY TO MRS. 
STEFFENSEN AS THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD. 
Smith's argues that it owed no duty to Mrs. Steffensen to 
protect her from the acts of Mr. Burnett prior to having 
knowledge that a crime was being committed. Brief of 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 7-8. In making this argument, 
Smith's ignores the clear language of the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals stated, "We recognize the trial 
judge's decision in finding Smith's owed Mrs. Steffensen a duty 
to take reasonable precautions to protect her from the criminal 
acts of third parties was correct." 820 P.2d at 489, n. 5. 
In support of its position, Smith cites Dwiggins v. Morgan's 
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). Smith's argues that Dwiqgins 
stands for the notion that it owed Mrs. Steffensen no duty 
because Smith's had no reason to know that Burnett was engaged in 
criminal activity. However, Dwiggins, which involved injury to a 
customer during the course of a robbery, is distinguishable from 
this case. In Dwiggins, the Court stated: 
The acts alleged in this case fail to 
establish the requisite level of 
foreseeability. Morgan Jewelers did not have 
reason to know that the store was about to be 
robbed. One robbery [of the store] five 
13 
years earlier is insufficient to make a 
subsequent robbery foreseeable and therefore 
does not give rise to a duty on the part of 
Morgan Jewelers. 
811 P.2d at 183 (footnote omitted). 
Dwicrcrins does not foreclose merchant liability for the 
criminal acts of third persons. Dwiaains simply stands for the 
proposition that a duty does not arise on the part of a merchant 
until an event is sufficiently foreseeable by the merchant. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that Dwiaains cites Taco 
Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46-49 (Colo. 1987), in which 
the Colorado Supreme Court held that ten armed robberies in three 
years at the same Taco Bell restaurant made the likelihood of 
injury to a customer during an armed robbery a foreseeable event. 
The Colorado court therefore held that Taco Bell had a legal duty 
to take measures to protect its customers. 744 P.2d at 49-50. 
The Smith's store where Mrs. Steffensen was injured deals 
with shoplifting incidents and arrests on a regular basis. In 
fact, Robert Gratten, a former security officer for Smith's, 
testified that 2-3 shoplifting incidents per day occurred at the 
store and that he witnessed incidents involving shoplifters at 
the store being chased by store employees. (R. 1211 at 89, 93-94, 
104) He also testified that some of these chases resulted in 
injuries. (R. 1211 at 89-104) Warren Cocke, one of Smith's 
experts, verified the potential danger of shoplifting situations. 
(R. 1247 at 520) Mr. Cocke also testified that at least 5 out of 
100 attempted arrests result in suspects running. (R. 1247 at 
491) Furthermore, Smith's employee manuals recognized the 
14 
potential for injury to customers caused by shoplifters. One of 
those manuals stated: 
Our company policy is that no employee is to 
take any action in the apprehension of a 
shoplifter which will bring harm to himself, 
to other employees, or to customers. The 
most important thing to remember about 
apprehending a shoplifter is that we do not 
want anyone injured. There is nothing in the 
store that is worth a person getting hurt 
for. Use common sense, if the situation 
can't be properly controlled let the 
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license 
number. 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 489, n. 4. Smith's brief cites no 
evidence which would indicate that it could not reasonably 
foresee the events in this case. Thus, any claim that Smith's 
could not reasonably anticipate a shoplifter fleeing or a 
customer getting hurt by the acts of a shoplifter is simply 
unsupported by the evidence. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals cited the relevant 
facts of this case and distinguished Dwiggins in holding that 
Smith's owed a duty to Mrs. Steffensen. Specifically, the Court 
of Appeals stated: 
Since trial, the Utah Supreme Court has 
visited the issue of shop owner's duty to 
protect customers from the criminal acts of 
third parties. See Dwiggins v. Morgan's 
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). In 
Dwiggins. the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
Section 344 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts, 
stating land owners have a duty to business 
invitees to take reasonable steps to protect 
invitees from the criminal acts of third 
parties where such acts are reasonably 
foreseeable. The Dwiggins court held where a 
jewelry store had only been robbed once in 
ten years, a robbery is not foreseeable. 
However, Dwiggins is distinguishable because 
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the store in question was the most frequently 
shoplifted store in the Smith's chain. 
Further, the fact that Smith's employee 
manuals advocate the safe handling of 
shoplifters demonstrates Smith's did, in 
fact, foresee such criminal acts. Therefore, 
we believe the trial judge properly found 
that the customer's injury from shoplifters 
was foreseeable, the law imposed a duty on 
Smith's to take reasonable measures to 
protect its customers from injuries resulting 
from dealing with shoplifters. See also Taco 
Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46-49 
(Colo. 1987) (Store owner had a duty to take 
reasonable security measures to protect 
customers where store had been the subject of 
armed robbery ten times in past three years) 
(relied on by Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 n. 
1.). 
820 P.2d at 489, n. 5.4 
Smith's argument that it owed no duty to Mrs. Steffensen is 
not supported by either the facts or the case law. The Court of 
Appeals correctly held that Smith's owed a duty to Mrs. 
Steffensen and the trial court erroneously directed a verdict in 
favor of Smith's. 
4
 The court's statement that the Smith's store in which 
Mrs. Steffensen was injured "was the most frequently shoplifted 
store in the Smith's chain" may not be entirely accurate. Robert 
Gratten, a Smith's loss prevention officer who had worked at the 
store in question, initially gave a statement in which he stated 
the store was among the worst as far as frequency of shoplifting 
with five to seven shoplifting incidents per day. (R. 1211 at 102-
03) At trial, Mr. Gratten testified that the store was not the 
worst but rather "middle of the road." (R. 1211 at 103) However, 
the two to three shoplifting incidents per day with two shoplifters 
per week attempting to flee that Mr. Gratten testified to at trial 
clearly put Smith's on notice of a serious problem with the 
potentially disastrous consequences which were realized in this 
case. (R. 1211 at 94, 104). 
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REPLY TO SMITH'S RESPONSE TO MRS. STEFFENSEN1 S OPENING BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In replying to Smithfs response to her opening brief, Mrs. 
Steffensen argues that Smith's fails to cite any case in which an 
appellate court of this state has held the granting of a directed 
verdict to be erroneous, but has applied a harmless error 
analysis to affirm the trial court. The application of such 
analysis is incompatible with the standard of review for a 
directed verdict. 
Mrs. Steffensen next contends one of the jury instructions 
misstated the law of foreseeability. Smith's argument to the 
contrary ignores facts and case law. 
Finally, Mrs. Steffensen asserts that the Court of Appeals 
erred in upholding the trial court's exclusion of evidence. 
Smith's has ignored recent case law in arguing in support of the 
Court of Appeals' opinion. 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO SMITH'S UNSUPPORTED ASSERTION, THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS 
AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
GRANTED SMITH'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
In her opening brief, Mrs. Steffensen argues that when the 
Court of Appeals applied a harmless error analysis after 
determining that the trial court had erroneously granted a motion 
for a partial directed verdict, the Court of Appeals decided an 
important question of first impression in this state. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals decided the question in a way 
which conflicts with dozens of cases decided by this Court over a 
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substantial period of time. Mrs. Steffensen noted that ff[a] 
review of forty years of cases from the Utah Supreme Court 
reveals that the Court has never held an erroneously granted 
directed verdict to be harmless error.11 Brief of Petitioner at 
13. 
In response, Smithfs claims that the statistics provided in 
Mrs. Steffensenfs brief do "not conclusively support her position 
that harmless error analysis does not apply to directed 
verdicts." Furthermore, Smith1s cites two cases in which it 
claims this Court has "applied harmless error analysis in appeals 
of directed verdicts." However, the cases cited by Smith's are 
simply not applicable to this case. 
Smith's first cites Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039 
(Utah 1981), as an example of the application of a harmless error 
analysis to a directed verdict by this Court. In fact, a cursory 
examination of Martineau reveals the differences between that 
case and this one. Martineau involved a claim arising from an 
auto accident. Following the presentation of evidence, the 
plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability. 
636 P.2d at 1041. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion 
and the case was submitted to the jury on general verdicts. Id. 
The jury eventually returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
but awarded only nominal damages. The plaintiff alleged that the 
trial court committed error by refusing to direct a verdict on 
the liability issue. This Court held, "Given the decision 
reached by the jury, the Court's refusal to direct a verdict is a 
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moot." 636 P.2d at 1041-42. The Court then did say that because 
the liability issue was decided in favor of the plaintiff, the 
error in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
"is rendered harmless." 636 P.2d at 1042. 
Martineau is plainly inapplicable to this case. In that 
case the trial court refused to direct a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, whereas in this case, the trial court granted a 
verdict in favor of the defendant.5 Furthermore, because of the 
outcome on the issues of liability and damages, the court held 
that the trial court's refusal to grant the directed verdict was 
"moot". In contrast, in this case the Court of Appeals found the 
trial court's direction of partial verdict in favor of the 
defendant was erroneous. In short, Smith's fails to note that 
Martineau was in an entirely different procedural posture than 
this case. 
Smith's also cites Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 
i, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982), as a case in which it says the Utah 
Supreme Court applied a harmless error analysis to a directed 
verdict. Once again, the procedural posture of the case 
differentiates it from this case. In Cerritos Trucking, after 
both parties had presented their evidence, plaintiffs moved for 
directed verdicts. The trial court granted the plaintiff's 
motions for directed verdicts and the defendant's counter-claims 
5
 In this regard Smith's fails to realize that the 
statement made in Mrs. Steffensen's opening brief is that "a review 
of forty years of cases from the Utah Supreme Court reveals that 
the Court has never held an erroneously granted directed verdict to 
be harmless error." (emphasis added). 
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and cross-claims were dismissed. The defendants appealed, urging 
that the trial court's direction of verdicts was erroneous and 
further that the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard to 
the motions for directed verdict. 645 P.2d at 611. The Court 
held that "There was no basis upon which the defendants could 
have prevailed on their claim and the directed verdict in favor 
of the plaintiffs was properly granted.11 645 P.2d at 612. On 
another of the plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict the 
Court also found that defendant's claim was "groundless and the 
court properly directed a verdict against him on that claim." 
645 P.2d at 612. The Supreme Court then applied a harmless error 
analysis, not in the evaluation of the directed verdicts, but in 
the determination of whether the trial judge applied the proper 
standard in considering the weight of the evidence in granting 
the motions for directed verdicts. The Court concluded, 
"Although in passing on a motion for directed verdict, it is not 
proper for the trial judge to weigh evidence, that he did so in 
this case did not result in prejudicial error since the 
defendants were not entitled to success in any event." 645 P.2d 
at 613. 
Cerritos Trucking does not apply in this instance because in 
that case the appellate court found that the directed verdicts 
were properly granted. In contrast, in this case, the Court of 
Appeals found that the directed verdict was erroneously granted. 
Smith's has failed to cite any case in which an appellate 
court of this state has held the granting of a directed verdict 
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to be erroneous, but has applied a harmless error analysis to 
affirm the trial court. As noted in Mrs. Steffensen's opening 
brief, a harmless error analysis is inconsistent with an 
appellate court's ruling that a directed ruling has been 
erroneously granted. Brief of Petitioner at 8-16. 
Smith's also asserts that Mrs. Steffensen "must show that 
the error [in the direction of a verdict] was prejudicial in that 
it substantially affected the outcome of her case as it was 
presented to the jury." Brief of Respondent at 11. As argued in 
Mrs. Steffensen's opening brief, that is simply not a correct 
statement of the law. If an appellate court finds that a verdict 
was erroneously directed, it has found that reasonable minds 
could differ on the facts and that a verdict in favor of the 
losing party could be supported by the evidence. Management 
Comm. v. Greystone Pines, Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). 
In essence, the standard of appellate review carries a 
presumption of prejudice. 
However, even if Smith's assertion were a correct statement 
of the law, Mrs. Steffensen's opening brief demonstrated the 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome if all the issues had been 
properly presented to the jury. Brief of Petitioner at 16-18. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a different result was 
likely, but for the trial court's error in directing a verdict. 
Even though Smith's does not acknowledge it, the Court of Appeals 
stated: 
There was probably sufficient evidence 
produced from which a reasonable juror could 
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infer that Smith's failure to deter was a 
negligent act, as it would have been 
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately 
training employee that his or her decision to 
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store 
could have led to a customer's injury. 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 489 (footnote omitted). In effect, the 
Court of Appeals found a reasonable juror could have found in 
favor of Mrs. Steffensen. Therefore, the error in directing the 
verdict was prejudicial. 
POINT II 
CONTRARY TO SMITH»S CLAIMf JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32 IS 
INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW. 
In her opening brief, Mrs. Steffensen claims that the trial 
court incorrectly instructed the jury on the issue of 
foreseeability. The instruction given by the trial court stated: 
Foreseeability in these instructions 
means injury or harm, if any, to a customer 
which the defendant and its employees could 
have reasonably anticipated as the natural 
consequences of their actions, if any, even 
though they were not able to anticipate the 
particular injury which did occur. 
In determining what is foreseeable, you 
must determine that the actions by Burnett 
were predictable by Smith's employees and not 
just a mere possibility. 
(R.944). The Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction was 
erroneous because it improperly focused on the actions of the 
specific shoplifter. 820 P.2d at 490. However, the court 
applied a harmless error analysis and concluded that the 
instruction was harmless. 820 P.2d at 490. Mrs. Steffensen 
further argues in her opening brief that the Court of Appeals 
effectively overruled Rees v. Albertson's, Inc. 587 P.2d 130, 133 
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(Utah 1978), in its discussion of foreseeability. 
In response, Smithfs argues that Instruction No. 32, which 
Smith's characterizes as "unfortunate," is compatible with Rees. 
Smith's then makes the amazing claim that the jury instruction 
"did not ... force the jury to deal specifically with the actions 
of a single shoplifter." Brief of Respondent at 13. In making 
these arguments, Smith's ignores Rees and the plain language of 
the jury instruction. 
In Rees, this Court specifically stated: "What is necessary 
to meet the test of negligence and proximate cause is that it be 
reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would 
occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of 
the same general nature." 587 P.2d at 133 (Emphasis added). The 
Court not only linked negligence and proximate cause to 
foreseeability, but it also stated that foreseeability was not 
limited to the particular set of circumstances which occurred. 
In essence, Rees forbids the instruction given in this case. 
Smith's argument also ignores other authorities cited by Mrs. 
Steffensen which state that "[F]oreseeability does not mean the 
precise hazard or exact consequences ... should have been 
foreseen." Brief of Petitioner at 18-22. 
Finally, Smith's assertion that the instruction "did not ... 
force the jury to deal specifically with the actions of a single 
shoplifter" is belied by the instruction itself. The instruction 
requires that in considering foreseeability, the jury "must 
determine that the actions by Burnett were predictable by Smith's 
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employees". The Court of Appeals agreed "that the specific 
identity of the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of 
foreseeability." Steffensen 820 P.2d at 490. The instruction at 
issue here constrained the jury to find that the specific 
shoplifter's actions were foreseeable before it could find in 
favor of Mrs. Steffensen. When this instruction was coupled with 
the trial court's erroneously directed verdict, the jury was 
forced to find that Smith's did not proximately cause Mrs. 
Steffensen's injuries. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED THE UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE AND IGNORED UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE LAW IN 
UPHOLDING THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE. 
In her opening brief, Mrs. Steffensen argues that the Court 
of Appeals erroneously upheld the trial court's exclusion of 
testimony from her expert regarding the involvement of Smith's 
security administrators in the training of employees in the 
handling and deterrence of shoplifters. Mrs. Steffensen further 
asserts thett the Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court's 
exclusion of evidence with respect to the apportionment of fault 
as an invasion of the province of the jury was incorrect and 
incompatible with the Rules of Evidence and Utah case law. Mrs. 
Steffensen also argues that the Court of Appeals' ruling that the 
exclusion of evidence on Smith's training procedures was harmless 
error was erroneous. Brief of Petitioner at 22-26. 
In response, Smith's argues that "even if the testimony 
about the training program were relevant, it would serve no 
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purpose and was likely to confuse the jury and distract them from 
the core issues of the case.11 Brief of Respondent at 15. 
Without citing the most recent case issued by the Utah Supreme 
Court, Smith's argues that the trial court's ruling on the issue 
of apportionment was proper. Finally, Smith's argues that Mrs. 
Steffensen has failed to demonstrate prejudice which would 
justify reversal of the trial court's evidentiary decisions. 
Smith's position ignores the facts of this case and case law from 
this Court. 
As pointed out in Mrs. Steffensen's opening brief, the 
expert's testimony regarding Smith's improper training methods 
was relevant because it would have demonstrated a causal link 
between the training and monitoring of shoplifting cases and the 
incident in this case. The expert would have testified that if 
proper training and monitoring procedures had been followed, the 
incident in this case would not have occurred. The expert's 
testimony would have demonstrated that Smith's negligence in its 
training procedures was the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's 
injuries. Brief of Petitioner at 24. 
With respect to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the 
expert's testimony regarding the apportionment of fault between 
Smith's and Burnett would have invaded the province of the jury, 
Smith's cites cases decided under the former rules of evidence. 
Brief of Respondent at 16. However, Smith's does not cite the 
most recent pronouncement from this Court on the issue of the 
admissibility of legal conclusions. In that case, State v. Span, 
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819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991), this Court gave a very broad 
interpretation to Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
Court statcad that the only limitation imposed by Rule 704 was 
that the expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 819 P.2d at 332, 
n.l. When this standard of admissibility is applied to the 
expert's testimony in this case, the inescapable conclusion is 
that the evidence should have been admitted. Accordingly, the 
holding of the Court of Appeals was erroneous. 
With respect to Smith's assertion that the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence was not prejudicial, Mrs. Steffensen argues 
that the exclusion of evidence was inextricably related to the 
other issues presented by this appeal. The trial court excluded 
relevant evidence of proximate cause and apportionment of fault 
and then justified the erroneous direction of a verdict and an 
erroneous jury instruction based on the lack of evidence. If all 
of the evidence had been heard, the trial court could have 
justified neither the direction of the verdict nor Jury 
Instruction No. 32. 
CONCLUSION 
Smith's ignores the facts of this case and case law in 
claiming that the Court of Appeals was wrong when it held that 
the trial court erroneously directed a verdict against Mrs. 
Steffensen. That portion of the Court of Appeals decision should 
be affirmed. 
Smith's has failed to cite any case in which an appellate 
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court of this state has held the granting of a directed verdict 
to be erroneous, but has applied a harmless error analysis to 
uphold the trial court. The Court of Appeals' application of a 
harmless error analysis in this case is simply incompatible with 
the standard of review to be applied by an appellate court to a 
directed verdict. Smith's does not even address this 
inconsistency. Smith's admits that Jury Instruction No. 32 was 
"unfortunate" but ignores case law from this state and other 
authorities which demonstrate the clear error and prejudice 
caused by the jury instruction. Finally, Smith's fails to deal 
with the most recent case from this jurisdiction regarding the 
Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling on the trial court's exclusion 
of significant evidence. 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals should be reversed, except as noted above, and 
the case remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S day of September, 1992. 
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27 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused for (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing brief to be mailed by United States mail, 
postage prepaid, this *fr day of September, 1992 to the 
following: 
Christopher A. Tolboe, Esq. 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
28 
